

Global Citizenship with Civic Responsibility

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I. Introduction

If we define a citizen as a person who holds legal rights in a 'city' and at the same time a person who has obligations as a member of the political community, citizenship is a political concept that is closely related to our daily lives even in the present era of globalization. The following two aspects justify this observation: First, although it is true that there is increased interest in the new form of identity that transcends the boundary of nation-states, the role of cities as minimal units of political community where multilevel and multi-aspect acts of governing at a provincial, regional, and global level as well as collective identity can be confirmed, is still important. As if to prove this, even in views which understand globalization as the appearance of a new political community and prospects which argue that due to the large-scale migration and the advent of new media like the Internet, nation-states are bound to disappear, cities are still considered as a central unit of global identity that embraces racial, regional and cultural differences (Sassen 1999; Appadurai 1996). Second, even though a new form of collective feeling of solidarity is denying or replacing the traditional political unit that used to induce social integration, cities as the minimal physical border that can request legal and institutional rights as well as political and normative duties are still valid. As certain post-industrial society critics assert, a new form of sense of solidarity which can substitute nation or the people can be produced by the amorphous collective belongingness that is formed spontaneously according to events (Hardt & Negri 2004; Zolo 1992). However, even in this case, the current meaning of cities as the political environment that can impose obligations and demand rights continuously cannot be denied.

Even if citizenship is not defined with a focus on cities, the concept is still an effective sociopolitical notion. The individual rights and civic duties have developed to the extent that the conception of city as a democratically institutionalized unit is stimulating our expectation and imagination. Additionally, it is true that in recent times, economic action and labor culture have become diversified and complex in the city unit. Though the flow of capital is centered on cities, it is not only constrained within the nation-state framework but also restrained by the reality that worldwide there are only few metropolis cities that can provide such a global space. Also when defining citizenship as not simply limited to receiving equal treatment from the state but also an institutional guarantee of substantial power that can participate in political deliberation and adjudication, and when saying that these institutional conditions are to be constituted and maintained through democratic procedures, the universal right which is mentioned in the

reorganization of world order centered on cities or the attitude that tries to explain citizenship only with the characteristic that a member of the world civil society that knows no state boundaries seems inappropriate. The reason is because even if we define democracy in the minimalist perspective, what the concept of citizenship has contributed cannot be explained only with a passive rights notion of holding equal legal qualification (Gutmann 2003; Benhabib 2002; Dahrendorf 1990). Also, in the process of discussing and converging diverse forms of rights and duties through democratic procedures, the responsibility required of citizens is still deeply related to the political representation that was achieved via people's sovereignty or nation-state and the modern accomplishment that social integration has.

Despite the fact that civic responsibility, not only as a political meaning of cities in the globalized world but also in the daily lives of the current era of democratization, is still the essential element of citizenship, the elements of citizenship related to civic responsibility in recent discussions concerning global citizenship and world civil society are not sufficiently highlighted. Though the main focus in debates on global citizenship is somewhat on seeking a political principle that makes the various ethnic, religious and racial groups coexist together, the actual reality is that there is no consistent and reasonable ground for sociopolitical deliberation contributing to the alleviation of political anxiety resulting from the decline of the welfare state model that globalization has brought about (Kwak 2007). Issues concerning passive citizenship like foreign workers' basic rights or multicultural coexistence are receiving spotlight, but democratic citizenship or the growing gap between the rich and the poor in international order is considered as a different topic to global citizenship. Also, starting from the presupposition that the nation-state-centered world order is receding, the following cases are frequently observed in the legal and procedural level: emphasizing only the personal choice that cannot be expected to accept collective responsibility or passing over citizens who are not able to be economically self-governing to the market without any institutional assistance. Amidst this, we can tell that on the one hand, civic responsibility is identified with an illusion about the Athenian democracy that can be found in participatory democrats who are trying to recover the substantial meaning of democracy through citizens' active political participation; and on the other hand, there is a tendency to degrade it as merely another expression for anachronistic collectivism or another totalitarianism that has not escaped completely from the nation-state framework.

Based on this awareness, this article examines the different approaches on citizenship and attempts to recapitulate the principal constituents of civic responsibility that is adequate in the current era of globalization. Specifically, by juxtaposing classical republicanism with the political principles that can realize civic responsibility, I will present the following two claims: First, the currently dominant perspectives of citizenship which will be explained in two traditions – liberalism and communitarianism or civic republicanism – have been extremely

negligent to civic responsibility or have committed the fallacy of equalizing civic responsibility with the virtue of group-superiority. Afterwards, classical republicanism will be presented as an alternative that can overcome these shortcomings and constitute the elements of citizenship which are adequate in today's globalized world. Second, the appropriate notion of global citizenship today must surpass the abstraction of mutual respect and tolerance which aims unilaterally at guaranteeing individual rights without considering citizen's sociopolitical responsibility. At this juncture, specified with Aristotle's conception of serious citizen, Machiavelli's notion of citizen's contestability, and Cicero's idea of decency, the elements of citizenship in classical republicanism will be converted to a regulative principle by which global citizenship can be manifested in terms of civic responsibility as a balance between individual autonomy and civic responsibility.

II. Two Traditions: Liberalism and Republicanism

Generally, citizenship may be understood as the sum of three factors (Carens 2000). The first factor is citizens' individual right that is defined as a set of sociopolitical rights in the form of citizens' legal and political status. What should be given the strongest emphasis here is that this right is a legal right through which individual citizens enjoy their lives within the boundary of legal protection. The second factor is the citizen ethos which can be cultivated through active participation in deliberation and adjudication on the matters of political community where she constitutes a part as a citizen. The passive tendency to preserve the self-endowed right is accentuated more than the active disposition to formulate the collective will of the political community, whereas the role of citizen who participates in the process of constituting a public policy and forming a collective opinion is especially stressed in the second factor. The last factor is self-identity appearing as citizenship which is internalized into every individual in a political community. Sometimes civic identity is used interchangeably with 'nation' or 'popular sovereignty,' but it is a term that may be applied broadly even though it is an old concept in a historical sense. In the process in which the demand for the rule of the people after the French Revolution was converted into the need for national self-determination, civic identity was used as the same meaning as national identity (Kwak 2006). However, civic identity, that is defined as a self-identity formed over a long time through the shared belief cultivated in a certain territory, may be applied everywhere ranging from the Athenian polis in the ancient epoch to the metropolis in a globalized period.

Among the three factors, the first and second ones are different from the third in which categorized according to historical contexts, they are frequently considered as the vestiges of a certain tradition. For example, it is said that the first factor referring to individual rights is

modern, whereas the second factor relevant to civic responsibility is discussed as one of the remains of ancient polis phenomenon. Yet if the characteristics of citizenship are explained through this chronological categorization, there is a high possibility to distort the reality of citizenship because of the following two reasons: First, although individual rights with which individual liberty can be guaranteed is highly emphasized in the tradition of modern liberalism, citizenship in the form of legal and institutional status had already existed before the emergence of liberalism. Since Solon's Reform, there were citizen(*polites*)'s rights to be protected by laws which differentiated citizens or free men from slaves in Athens. These rights were specified by the principles such as *isonomia* (the right to be treated equally in the application of the law), *isegoria* (the right to have equal opportunity in the matter of political speech), *isogonia* (the right not to be discriminated on the basis of birth) and *isokratia* (the right to share political power equally) (Manville 1990). Second, there is also a problem in presupposing that civic responsibility is only possible in a small-size political community like the polis in the context of the classical Greek terminology or in concluding that civic responsibility is an idea that prioritizes the whole over the part but at the expense of individual liberty. In the liberal tradition, there is a cognition that civic virtue can coexist with individual liberty as well as individual diversity. At this juncture, civic responsibility may be embodied in the liberal conception of mutual respect needed to mediate the individuals' rights and the public needs or as other liberal values (Macedo 1996; Galston 2002). Moreover, when seeing that the view that civic responsibility can be actualized through cities rather than nation-states or regional units is most prevalent, it is awkward to say that only Athens in 5th century BC where approximately 20,000 people of 300,000 inhabitants were citizens is a face-to-face society in which we can expect a high level of civic responsibility.

1) Liberalism and Communitarianism

In contrast, there is no big problem in examining citizenship by dividing it in the tradition of liberalism and communitarianism or civic republicanism according to the differences in the epistemological and sociopolitical understanding. Above all, when looking at their originations, there is the merit of the two traditions encompassing the diverse variations of citizenship from the past to the present. For instance, the liberal tradition that emphasizes legal and institutional guarantees, rather than active political participation, is derived from the citizenship held by the citizens of the Roman Empire (Walzer 1989). The Roman Republic's citizen(*civis*) whose daily life was based on the city(*civitas*) shared the conditions of political life with other fellow citizens and at the same time she was a political agent who should be able to participate directly and indirectly in the political process. But the early modern comprehension of Roman law was

based on the imagination of the political situation that the territory of the Roman republic was expanded to become an empire, whereby sociopolitical rights guaranteed by law were stressed more than sociopolitical roles as a member of the political community (Sherwin-White 1973). Consequentially, if one uses an epistemological and sociopolitical distinction, she could grasp clearly the differences in stances in accordance not with the chronological categorization but with what each stance emphasizes. Additionally, the epistemological and sociopolitical distinction merits serious considerations, since it may not just effectively help us figure out theoretical tensions between different stances but it will be also very useful in discussing what the desirable and agreeable elements of citizenship are. Actually, the debates currently in process are carried out surrounding the two traditions. The scholarly controversy on citizenship originated from the communitarian criticism that the liberal concept of citizenship is too narrow, and the communitarians or civic republicans' stance, which emphasizes the citizens' political participation, is considered as the most likely alternative. Thus it is not an exaggeration to say that the recent contentions relevant to citizenship haven't gone further than the clash of two traditions. In fact, even if the framework of nation-state is not insisted, the matter of whether the passive rights assured by legal and institutional mechanisms are emphasized, or active political participation as a member of the community is highlighted, is still monumental.

Though there are numerous variations existing between the two traditions, the differences in the liberal and communitarian traditions in viewing citizenship can be broadly divided into epistemological and sociopolitical aspects. The first epistemological difference is originated from the independent individual emphasized in the liberal citizenship and the mutually interdependent human in the communitarian citizenship. In fact, in the words of Thomas Hobbes, the father of the liberal tradition, human beings establish a political society for survival, on the contrary the communitarian stance is based on Aristotle's statement that human beings group together for 'a good life' (*eu zen*). Therefore, in the former conception human beings are considered to be independent and essentially asocial, while the latter argues that human beings are mutually dependent on each other and essentially manifest themselves through society (Kwak 2008). As a result, a citizen in the liberal tradition starts fundamentally from an isolated individual from society and remains as an individual. The private and public spheres are clearly separated; the pursuit of personal interests in the process of acquiring citizenship or exercising the individual right must be prioritized over public affairs; and citizens should not be in any circumstances forced to participate in politics if they do not wish to do so. On the other hand, as it can be seen in <Chart 1>, a citizen in the civic republicanism tradition can only be happy when one acts in accordance with one's nature through active political participation: the citizen is not an isolated figure. For this reason, in liberal tradition, we cannot use the expression *idios anthropos* (individual person) as an opposite notion of a person who

does not actively participate in the public sphere, but in a community of which civic republicans dream, we can publicly call people who are not able to fulfill their civic responsibility 'useless' as Perikles has said (Thucydides 2.40).

The second difference depends on whether the focus is on civic rights or on civic virtue. To be more specific, the two perspectives show a big difference in understanding political power and political process. In liberalism, political power is sometimes regarded as a concept conflicting with the rights of citizens. Starting from the time when the rights of the free citizen were reinterpreted through Roman law and from the period when liberalism emerged as an alternative to feudal and hierarchical discrimination, human beings in liberalism were regarded as having inviolable rights endowed by nature. From the beginning of liberalism, there was a belief that political power should be legally and institutionally 'limited' in order to protect these inviolable rights. Afterwards, from the spread of capitalism to the recognition of citizenship as a national identity, citizenship in liberalism is an individual area which is free from the obstruction of political power and simultaneously, it signifies political equality in the form of political rights to have a say in the political process (Heater 1999). In contrast, as it can be observed in <Chart 1>, in communitarianism citizenship is not considered to be independent from the political process. For communitarians, citizenship is not an inviolable area that should be protected from political power but a type of political accomplishment of the citizens acquired through active participation in the political process. The ideal citizen is an important political agent who forms or counterbalances political power (Pocock 1989). Moreover, political participation is the fulfillment of human nature, and citizenship is understood as a citizen qualification gained by actively participating in the political process, rather than a natural right. In sum, if liberalism concentrates on the citizens' rights which need to be legally and institutionally protected, communitarianism focuses on civic virtue that is played out by actively participating in deliberation and in the policy-making process.

The discrepancy in the two traditions can be found in the discussions related to global citizenship. If in the perspective of liberalism global citizenship is thought to be feasible when it is agreed upon as a legal and institutional right, then in the perspective of communitarianism global citizenship is unfeasible or there is a risk of conflict with civic virtue. These differences appear because whereas liberalism espouses subjectivism based on universalism of which cultural differences matter little, communitarianism champions objectivism that appeals to the community members' intuition and the cultural particularity as the whole part of the accumulated life of the community. Although it may seem as if it is a complex conceptual scheme, it is actually a very simple one. Liberalism adheres to universalism that argues that all human beings have commonalities, and in the same reason it maintains subjectivism that asserts that an individual makes the final decision. Thus, global citizenship similar to citizenship can be

specified as a legal and institutional right and in the process of specifying global citizenship, it is viewed that a universal standard can greatly contribute in overcoming the discrepancies in groups or states. On the other hand, communitarianism highlights the differences in groups derived from unique cultural particularities and holds the standpoint that an objective standard for public interest may be proposed on the precondition that when one is a member of a certain group, one can intuitively recognize what is the public good. This combination of particularism and objectivism refuses the universal principle that can simultaneously guarantee the individual's basic rights and citizens' freedom irrespectively of the group of state boundaries. Hence, reckless loyalty to one's political community cannot be justified as civic virtue or patriotism. Also, if the duty to sacrifice for the interest and the shared value of the community conflicts with the responsibility to maintain solidarity among members and the communal identity, global citizenship cannot be specified as a essential moral virtue that a citizen should have.

<Chart 1> Liberalism and Communitarianism (Civic Republicanism)

	Liberalism	Communitarianism (Civic Republicanism)
Epistemological Difference	(a) Human beings are separated, isolated, and independent. (b) Their aim to build up a society is identical with that of other social animals, i.e., it is to ensure security.	(a) Human beings are essentially social and interdependent; thus, they exist within the interrelation. (b) What they pursue is not subsistence but <i>eu zen</i> (living well), or <i>eudaimonia</i> (happiness).
Difference in Sociopolitical Perspective	(a) Citizenship is a legal and institutional right which is free from political power. (b) It is a means to protect the rights of individuals who participate in politics. (c) Citizenship is an institutionalized version of inviolable human rights, and it can be specified as political equality in the political process.	(a) Citizenship is a civic virtue which is formed and demanded in the process of constituting political power. (b) Political participation is a restitution of naturalness and an inevitable action. (c) Citizenship is made through the political process, and can be specified as civic virtue in the political process.
Difference in Viewing	(a) Universalism: It assumes the universality of human beings.	(a) Particularism: As there is no person who deviated from the

Global Citizenship	<p>Regardless of cultural differences, what humans pursue are the same.</p> <p>(b) Subjectivism: The final decision is reverted to the individual. Therefore, the will of individuals are prioritized to all other matters in every decision-making.</p> <p>(c) If global citizenship is legally and institutionally constituted centered on universal rights, it can be sufficiently actualized.</p>	<p>community, everyone in the community is different and has cultural differences.</p> <p>(b) Objectivism: When humans become a part of a community, they intuitively perceive the aim of the community, and through this, they acquire their own identity.</p> <p>(c) Global citizenship can be in conflict with civic virtue that is formed in a particular context.</p>
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2) Neo-Roman Republicanism and Civic responsibility

With the appearance of classical republicanism which is represented by ‘neo-Roman’ republicanism, the tension between liberalism and communitarianism that is surrounding citizenship faces a new dimension. Active citizenship that modeled on ancient Athenian democracy through participative democracy researches since 1960s has been spotlighted by communitarianism and the political standpoints emphasizing the common good or solidarity through the criticism of liberal democracy in the 1980s constitute the main points of communitarianism. Since then, communitarianism has been mistaken as if representing the republican tradition. By the same token, republicanism has been explained as a stance that stresses active political participation prioritizing the public more than the individual. However, starting from the late 1990s, as diverse standpoints emerged within republicanism, communitarianism was re-constructed as one of the many versions of republicanism: civic republicanism. Moreover, neo-Roman republicanism, which is different from liberalism in that it is anti-atomist, and at the same time different from communitarianism in that it is anti-collective, has begun to attract attention. It is called neo-Roman republicanism, because it seeks the origin of republicanism in the political principles which can be traced back to the Roman republic, whereby it differentiates itself from the civic republicanism that finds its model in Aristotle and Athenian democracy. Furthermore, neo-Roman republicanism is considered a form of liberal republicanism, for it does not omit the fact individuals can be selfish and it does not regard political participation as the core of citizenship (Kwak 2007). As can be seen in <Chart 2>, this is due to three reasons. In epistemological terms, it is acknowledged that individuals can only be mutually dependent, but it does not presume that human beings are by nature social.

Also, self-rule through the participation in the political area is understood as a one of the conditions that can satisfy multiple desires that an individual feels rather than considering it as ideal. Civic virtue is understood as being constituted through political judgment reached via deliberation in the state where citizens' autonomy and diversity is guaranteed rather than being constituted as a objective purpose that can be perceived intuitively by community members.

<Chart 2> Civic Republicanism and Neo-Roman Republicanism

	Communitarianism (Civic Republicanism)	Neo-Roman Republicanism
Viewpoint on Human	(a) Interdependent; (b) inevitability and naturalness of aggregation. (Humans realize the nature given to each individual through the society. Humans are naturally political and communal.)	(a) Interdependent; (b) rejects the inevitability of community formation. (Community is needed to realize the selfish desires of each individual. Human nature does not necessarily need to be social.)
Sociopolitical Perspective	(a) Participation, as a manifestation of natural inclination, is inevitable. (b) The purpose lies in the political participation itself.	(a) Participation is a means to preserve freedom. (b) Its purpose is to have a political voice in community affairs.
Civic Virtue	(a) It is a natural substance which can be perceived intuitively by members in a political community. (b) It is a manifest, evident, and pre-political duty.	(a) It is a shared good of individuals in a community whose affection for the community is based on their daily experiences on non-dominative conditions. (b) It is a political artifact required to accompany with political judgment through deliberation.

There are two aspects to be taken into consideration. The first thing to recognize is the sociopolitical meaning that the emergence of neo-Roman republicanism holds. The rise of neo-Roman republicanism is a response to the problem that creates the prejudice of considering

citizenship only as a legal and institutional right in the global phenomenon of the triumph of liberal democracy. Doubtlessly, civic republicanism is also an answer to this kind of problem. However, neo-Roman republicanism, apart from having a similar identification of the problem with civic republicanism, is a very different and new type of response. In the epistemological aspect, the natural tendency to form communities is rejected. By doing so, the group inclination of civic republicanism is de-emphasized. In the sociopolitical aspect, the methodological significance of political participation is emphasized. As a result, the totalitarian inclination of civic republicanism is blocked. In short, the method to link public good to individual desire originating from selfishness, or methodologically speaking, maintaining the liberal attitude that is based on the individual and as a purpose, adding the tradition of republicanism based on public good. Second, neo-Roman republicanism has promoted individual freedom to a condition of civic responsibility. To follow the categorization of Isaiah Berlin, neo-Roman republicanism is neither a negative freedom signifying the 'lack of interference' nor a positive freedom referring to 'the exercise of civic ability' through political participation (Berlin 1969). Liberty in neo-Roman republicanism means non-domination signifying the classical conception of liberty that is 'freedom from the arbitrary will of other people.' Civic responsibility here means civic virtue that is naturally played out in daily life by individuals who experience non-dominative conditions. In other words, civic responsibility in neo-Roman republicanism is a fruit of the citizens' political practices to maintain liberty as non-domination and an endeavor to satisfy non-dominative conditions in which the intervention of state or community and the citizen's contestability against any possible arbitrary use of these interventions (Pettit 1997).

There is no difference in opinion on the fact that neo-Roman republicanism accurately explains the reason why we need to trace back to classical thinkers before liberalism in our search for an appropriate way to solve the tension between individual autonomy and civic responsibility. Yet, it would be an exaggeration to say that neo-Roman republicanism comprises all pre-modern republicanism, or classical republicanism. This is because although it is the general trend of classical republicanism to write about the political thoughts of Aristotle, Cicero and Machiavelli, there are times when even on the same thinker is interpreted in various conflicting ways. For example, scholars like Maurizio Viroli exclude Aristotle from the classical republicanism tradition (Viroli 2002); Tim Duvall and Paul Dotson reject the very interpretation of connecting communitarianism with Aristotle (Duvall & Dotson 1998). The discrepancies in the interpretation of major thinkers of classical republicanism do not simply reflect the opposing stances in interpretation. The more fundamental reason is that there is always a possibility of interpreting the same thing differently depending on whether one lays the emphasis on one or the other vital element of classical republicanism: on the first one, which emphasizes citizens' direct political participation, or the second, which stresses the inevitability of deliberation by

representatives. In this vein, it is not surprising that neo-Roman republicanism is being challenged by participatory democrats and criticized by classical republicanism that is focused on civic responsibility embodied with political participation. This is because in the case of neo-Roman republicanism, the instrumental characteristic of political participation is highlighted, while the political participation of the people as a whole in political decision is relatively limited in its liberal tendency.

Among the diverse criticisms on neo-Roman republicanism, it is worth pointing out the remark related to civic responsibility. Neo-Roman republicanism argues that if non-dominative conditions are guaranteed, citizens naturally acquire civic responsibility. Nevertheless, the argument that when non-dominative conditions are guaranteed, citizens will automatically exercise their contestability and thereby attain a thorough civic consciousness, is not very persuasive. This neo-Roman republican argument needs to be complemented at least in the following two aspects. First, the assertion that civic responsibility can be cultivated only through the assurance of legal and institutional non-dominative condition is not far from political passivity that connotes the very reason why neo-Roman republican theorists criticize the liberal conception of negative liberty. The conceptual framework of citizenship of neo-Roman republicans is conceptualized with the rule of law through which the selfishness of human beings is controlled, civic virtue is enforced, and the conflicts among groups can be moderated (Skinner 1991, 48; Pettit 1997, 172-183). Nonetheless, these legal and institutional claims were not sufficient to meet the expectations of classical republicans who wanted to construct a more deliberative, embracing and highly responsive civic responsibility through the concept of liberty as non-domination. Legal and institutional guarantees will make a certain contribution to the formation of citizenship. But it is inadequate to be silent over the responsibility that a citizen should take up as a political agent who constitutes the law and institution. Second, though there is no big problem in viewing political participation as a means to preserve the non-dominative condition, the neo-Roman republican understanding of the instrumentality of politics based on the presupposition of selfish individual is problematic because it reflects its immersion in the liberal tradition. In the classical republican tradition, there is a clear distinction between selfishness and self-love. The former is the desire for material goods, whereas the latter is the love of human beings. To be more specific, reciprocity shaped through the desire for material goods is contractual mutuality, while reciprocity based on the love of human beings is inter-subjective mutuality constructed through the process of mutual recognition in which one can develop a self-identity only when one has learned to view oneself in the relation with others. Without these supplements in the two aspects, it would be difficult to expect civic responsibility to play a bridge role between liberalism and civic republicanism.

III. Classical Republicanism and Civic responsibility

In contrast to neo-Roman republicanism, classical republicanism may be seen as a more plausible framework to enable us to do justice to civic responsibility in three respects. First, considering the neo-Roman denial of the naturalness of human gathering as the liberal tendency of neo-Roman republicanism, classical republicanism understands human sociability as a quasi-nature derived from a certain seed (*quasi semina*) given by nature, rather than from a weakness of human beings. In other words, human sociability is not simply for individual survival but for the well-being of the public (*communem salutem*). In this context, liberty as non-domination is suggested as a political principle that guides a way of constituting laws for the sake of the well-being of the public (*Re Publica* 1.39). At this juncture, citizenship defined as a way of legal and institutional realization of liberty as non-domination can be linked to civic responsibility conducive to civic solidarity without special institutional enforcement. Second, classical republicanism provides the theoretical underpinnings of political aspirations that can transit a material-centered way of thinking to an anthropocentric thinking. As it is shown in the theme defined as ‘love of recognition,’ the imperative of self-love in classical republicanism is its way of generating inter-subjective reciprocity that mediates interactions between members through their concerns of the normative perspective of other members. The question of citizenship cannot be answered simply and solely by one’s physical presence in a territory or one’s legal rights. It is a subject of political deliberation which cannot be the same as calling someone a citizen merely because she lives in a certain region. Furthermore, the contestability of citizens in classical republicanism presupposes a partnership based on civic trust (*fides*) which discredits a liberal propensity for exaggerating the need for the exclusion of direct political participation by the people as a group. Shortly put, in classical republicanism, the partnership based on civic trust is conceptualized with a substantial balance between the democratic authority of the elected representative and the citizens’ liberty as non-domination, and this substantial balance is converted to a political condition for democratic deliberation that takes place only under the non-dominative condition.

In this context, I intend to specify the citizenship of classical republicanism in three dimensions. Particularly, at the individual level, I will scrutinize the probable ways in which liberty as non-domination can be applied reciprocally in a political community; at the state level, I will focus on the contestability of citizens as an institutional mechanism that can maintain liberty as non-domination as well as the continuous transformation of the political system through the severe conflicts among groups; and at the international level, citizenship in classical republicanism will be reformulated into a form of global citizenship that protects spaces for people to pursue civic responsibility as well as human responsibility.

<Chart 3> Neo-Roman Republicanism and Classical Republicanism

	Neo-Roman Republicanism	Classical Republicanism
Epistemology on Human	(a) Mutually interdependent (b) Denial of the naturalness of human sociability	(a) Mutually interdependent (b) Partial acknowledgement of the naturalness of human sociability
Sociopolitical Perspective	(a) Political participation as an instrument for protecting liberty as non-domination. (b) Political participation is a way of realizing individuals' selfish interest, whereby the instrumentality of political participation is emphasized.	(a) Political participation as an instrument for protecting liberty as non-domination. (b) Political participation is a way of actualizing self-love, in which stress is laid on self-realization rather than the instrumentality of political participation._

1) Individual Level: Aristotle's Serious Citizen

Neo-Roman republicans regard every attempt to render Aristotle a forefather of classical republicanism as a “historiographical” mistake (Viroli 2002, 65). But Aristotle is a prerequisite in understanding classical republicanism, since Aristotle's influence on the theorists of Roman republic and the Renaissance civic humanists in the republican tradition cannot be underestimated. Certainly, if we tackle only Aristotle's accounts of the relationship between the individual and the city as a part-whole relationship, it would be hard for us to discuss civic responsibility that is quite different from self-denial sacrifice presented by civic republicans. However, Aristotle has the multiple assets of harmonizing individual autonomy and common good (Kwak 2003). Especially, when specifying civic responsibility in classical republicanism, an investigation of the various ways Aristotle's discussion related to ‘good citizen’ and ‘good man’ reveals a very critical reasoning to answer the question of how an individual's sociopolitical and moral standard can be elevated to a public good.

In general, the distinction that Aristotle makes in Book 3 of *Politics* between a good citizen and a good man has been interpreted as the confrontation between politics and ethics or between the exceptional virtue that is required from citizens and the virtue expected from an excellent individual. However to be accurate, it is not a conflict of two moral criteria but that of

two different types of virtue. Actually, Aristotle does not make an opposition between ‘good citizen’ and ‘good man.’ The basic distinction from which Aristotle’s conception of citizenship begins is a comparison of a ‘good man’ with a ‘serious’ or ‘responsible citizen.’ In other words, it is a distinction between different virtues in different spheres, not a conflict between two opposing values (*Politics* 1276b17). In the instance of the former, a virtue that can be applied regardless of the problem faced by the political community and the characteristics of the political system, while in the case of the latter, there cannot be only one commensurable virtue, for what is required is different depending on the characteristics of the political system. As such, when the distinction between a good man and a good citizen is interpreted as a comparison of a good (*agathos*) man with a responsible (*spoudaios*) citizen, civic responsibility demanded in the individual level is not always identical with a normative quality that a good man must hold. Here, the focus in Aristotle’s switching the terms is on the perfect model of a citizen which can be relative to the regime’s understanding of a responsible citizen. The serious citizen is the one who approximates the best way of life for that regime, and thus civic responsibility is hence linked to the regime’s characteristics (*Politics* 1277a4). Namely, civic responsibility has a close relation with the characteristic of a political system of which an individual constitutes a part.

In Aristotle’s work, political friendship (*philia politike*) is a theme where civic responsibility and an appropriate regime for happiness can be found simultaneously. By civic republicans, Aristotle’s notion of political friendship is rendered as civic solidarity presupposing a comprehensive consensus on the public good (MacIntyre 1984, 155-156). Meanwhile, as recent classical scholars assert, political friendship can be better defined as civic cooperation based on reciprocal recognition rather than on altruistic devotion (Yack 1993, 109-127). Having defined political friendship as such, what we must be careful of is that Aristotle did not view political solidarity simply as a result of compromise through utility or competition. To him, consensus is something that can be achieved only in a relationship among considerate people (*epieikes*), or people who know to think on other people’s positions (NE 1167b4-14, 1166a31). In this classification, a person who pursues self-interest by sacrificing others, or a person who cannot voluntarily do good, is excluded. The relationship among considerate people that Aristotle defined requires an attitude of stepping into other people’s shoes and understanding other citizens. Doubtlessly, this does not mean that citizens should have saintly virtues or automatically develop a sense of solidarity within the community. However, this does mean that political friendship is not a contractual relationship based only on utility. What is needed in political friendship is the recognition of the needs of other citizens in a political community even when there are interests in conflict. If this kind of political friendship is formed in a political community, a responsible citizen can be a good man because all the serious citizens of a good polis are necessarily considerable men.

Based on Aristotle's 'serious' or 'responsible' citizen, we can argue that even in classical republicanism, tolerance and mutual respect, concepts which are traditionally highlighted in liberalism, are considered as important. However, there is a disparity in the contents. First of all, the contents found in liberalism – such as acceptance, indifference, and approval – are all irrelevant to tolerance in classical republicanism. Acceptance is rejected because it disapproves differences, indifference because it does not have preferences, and approval because it does not necessarily require a will to coexist. Tolerance in classical republicanism credits differences with a clear preference, and despite differences, it requires a will to a will to coexist. If the liberal understanding of tolerance is an action-oriented virtue derived from selfishness or individual moral judgment, the classical republican conception of tolerance is a condition-oriented virtue based on self-love or the reciprocal recognition of other citizens. In other words, civic responsibility in classical republicanism does not end in an abstract and ethical communication of dignity (*dignitas*) of human beings, but demands a practical and specific condition for assuring reciprocal non-domination.

2) State Level: Machiavelli's Democratic Contestability

The state-level feature that civic responsibility has in classical republicanism is generally composed of two things (Kwak 2008). First, classical republicanism exerts itself to actualize what civic republicans wish to make, such as mutually dependent relationship or deepening democracy through active political participation. It is also similar in that classical republicanism aims at rehabilitating civic virtue through political participation or redressing selfish preferences with democratic deliberation. Nonetheless, classical republicanism is different from civic republicanism in that there is an argument that the majority's will gained through democratic deliberation must satisfy the reciprocal non-domination as a political condition and that the contestability of citizens against the collective will contrary to this condition is condoned. Second, in the aspect that democracy is viewed as a competition among conflicting groups, rather than a decision-making through rational deliberation, classical republicanism shares parts of comments from scholars who advocate agonistic democracy. In the similar context, classical republicanism acknowledges a need for constitutional form in which ordinary individuals are capable of create a new form of constitution through democratic deliberation at any time. Yet, classical republicanism distances itself from such a post-modern way of thinking in the sense that it ponders over a constitutional framework which can guarantee reciprocal non-domination as a regulative principle that operates not only democratic deliberation but also collective decision. In summing up the two features, the most imperative of practicing civic responsibility at the state-level is a set of preconditions that have to be satisfied, the contestability of citizens

in maintaining reciprocal non-domination and the vigilance of citizens in monitoring the arbitrary use of political power is also very important. In the case of contestability, institutional assistance is particularly needed, and in the case of monitoring, a habituated attitude that can be found in daily political life is highly recommended.

Machiavelli is the classical republican theorist who laid the greatest emphasis on democratic contestability as the content of civic responsibility at the state-level. His discussion of citizens' contestability has two goals. The first is to construct a set of republican principles driven from the selfish dispositions of the ordinary people whom Aristotle would have regarded as 'inconsiderate' men. By rendering the selfish-love of possessions (*roba*) as one of legitimate human interests, Machiavelli intends to see a new way of thinking how these 'inconsiderate' or selfish individuals become attached to the community and how they can voluntarily make a contribution to the community. The second is to demonstrate that the transformation to the best possible republican regime as well as the actualization of the common good can be realized not through harmony or solidarity but through acute conflict. If the probability of political transformation through conflict is convinced, the best possible republican regime as a political ideal would be the subject of civic responsibility for citizens who endure sufferings in the constant possibility of arbitrary interference.

Machiavelli firstly concentrates on identifying liberty (*libertà*) as non-domination with the condition for republican life rather than with the goal of republican in his explanation of how selfish individuals exalt the public or common good. Book 1, Chapter 2 of the *Discorsi* is the exemplary one in which Machiavelli speaks approvingly of private interests in their connection with the public interest. He says the following to his contemporaries who believe that the glory of the Roman republic cannot be revived and to the nobles who assert that any democratic republican regime cannot cope with powerful foreign forces: 'To humans, liberty is the best condition for acquiring what one wants and if this condition is not met, we cannot expect civic responsibility.' (*Discorsi* 2.2. 43-48). That is, he stipulates that liberty as non-domination is the first condition of civic responsibility. For the second task – to show the actualization of the common good through conflict, he consistently remarks that the promotion of liberty as non-domination requires democratic contestability as a suitable precondition in existence for civic responsibility at the state level. To sum up Machiavelli's arguments on democratic contestability, first, liberty as non-domination – the desire not to be dominated — is a response of the people against the ambition of the nobles to dominate (*Discorsi* 1.4.9). Certainly, the desire not to be dominated by the great (*grandi*) may bring about the result of enthroning a tyrant as a consequence of self-deceptive choice (*Discorsi* 1.16 & 1.37). However, even though there are cases where the desire of avoiding domination sometimes escalates into other desires, this desire in itself is not a dangerous disposition. Second, non-domination as a

psychological disposition is the desire of the many who wish to protect liberty (*Discorsi* 1.5.7). Accordingly, when the ambition of the few and the desire of the many are in conflict, it can be said that the desire of the many to preserve liberty is the common good. Lastly, when we say that the law as legitimate is to maintain a balance established through conflicts between the many and the few (*Discorsi* 1.3.7), what may upset this balance is usually the insolence of the great (*la insolenzia de' grandi*). Therefore, when ordinary citizens are capable of exercising democratic contestability that the desire of the few to dominate can be checked, the two psychological dispositions – the desire to dominate and the desire to avoid domination – can create a dynamic balance. In other words, if a regime does not have a constitutional form of decision-making in which ordinary people can effectively contest any arbitrary use of political power, it would be difficult to expect civic responsibility.

All in all, democratic contestability in classical republicanism refers to the reciprocal balance as an institution that enables ordinary citizens, who constitute a majority in numbers but a minority in power and wealth, to mutually check and restrain the ruling group in a same condition. For Machiavelli, this kind of democratic contestability can be realized when representatives are selected in a free election, the appeal to the people is institutionalized not only to deal with demagogues but also to defend those who work for the common good, and the arrogance of the powerful and the license of the majority are curbed by the institutional or constitutional arrangements. At this juncture, democratic contestability is understood as a precondition of civic responsibility, whereby the negative meaning of citizenship in the sense of assuring sociopolitical rights is converted to the institutional embodiment of reciprocal non-domination through which non-arbitrariness is guaranteed for the many as well as the few. Civic responsibility associated with democratic contestability provides us with a new category of a desirable government, and simultaneously, it becomes a requirement for the promotion of liberty as non-domination.

3) International Level: Cicero's Civic Decorum

The last question of civic responsibility in classical republicanism is whether there is a political principle that can overcome the exclusivity of republican patriotism. In contrast to the general prejudice on republican patriotism, classical republicanism is very proactively responding to the contemporary trend of multicultural coexistence and the pluralistic factor that embraces dissimilar cultures in a society. First, it is a bit different from liberal approach in that it does not require a cosmopolitan political community. For classical republicans, moral requests which are independent from democratic deliberation cannot constitute the republican content of democratic citizenship. Therefore, both the idea of constitutional patriotism that conceptualizes

civic ethos without considering pre-political attachments and the conception of the ‘multitude’ that advocates an impromptu aggregation for global issues can be hardly approved by classical republicanism that requires not only a correlation between a political order and a way of life but also the maintenance of liberty as non-domination and the cultivation of civic responsibility. Classical republicanism does not value any ethnocentric pre-political attachment, while it does recognize the importance of commonality shaped through the interaction between individuals who have experienced liberty as non-domination. In this context, a republican political system must provide foreigners in its territory with liberty as non-domination; otherwise liberty as non-domination which is recognized by citizens as something applied in an arbitrary basis cannot supply the normative warrant for civic responsibility. Second, it is different from the liberal approach with regard to the issue of human rights. In classical republicanism, there is neither a *prima facie* human right nor the natural rights given by something beyond human control. Human rights are sociopolitical rights which must be sustained by laws and customs. By the same token, in classical republicanism, making a list of human rights must be a subject matter of public deliberation in reciprocal non-domination. Certainly, classical republicanism also carries out the normative claim that there is an obligation to citizens beyond the nation-state. However, it does not count on any cosmopolitan universalism. Instead, classical republicanism suggests liberty as non-domination as the normative basis for the obligation of citizens beyond the nation-state.

This type of classical republicanism stems from Cicero’s conception of decorum. For Cicero, decorum is the best civic virtue that a citizen should attain; decorum here is derived from the bases of everyday life and from the affection felt to fellow citizens who share those life grounds. There are two reasons why he finds decorum in patriotism, the love of country and one’s fellow citizens. First, Cicero views the civic solidarity that citizens feel in cities (*civitas*) as something stronger and friendlier than solidarity based on racial, tribal, national, and linguistic homogeneity: “The more intimate [solidarity] is that of the citizens living in the same city. This is because citizens have much in common: the forum, temples, porticoes and roads, laws and legal rights, law-courts and political elections, and besides many acquaintances and companionship, and diverse business transactions with many others” (*Officiis* I.53). Second, one’s fatherland (*patria*) is more precious than one’s parents, children, cousins, and friends (I.57). Private interests which are pursued at the expense of the public safety are unjust and cannot gain true glory, and any action conducted only for the sake of private advantages is nothing but greed rather than bravery (I.62-65; I.84). On the contrary, to defy death for one’s native country, and to serve for the public is a noble obligation and an indicator of a great mind (I.57 & 61). Doubtlessly, a republic should fulfill the individual’s basic desire of grouping into a political community, or the desire to preserve life and possessions (II.73). But this primitive task

of a republic in itself cannot justify the pursuit of private interests at the expense of the public interest. Individuals say when the republic is facing a crisis, “one must fight together by coming together, and we better prefer death to slavery or dishonorableness.” (I.81) As it is shown, Cicero’s decorum prioritizes the patriotic affection and the civic engagement to the particular political community, rather than a universal love for humanity.

Albeit this, Cicero contemplates a political principle of non-domination that can be applied equally at the state level as well as the international level. His principle of non-domination conceptualized either with the natural law (*lege naturae*) or with the human law (*ius humanae societatis*) is specified by three constituting factors. The first is the principle of non-interference, which signifies that the action of violating other people’s interests for the sake of one’s own interests, or impeding the free activity of other people, cannot be condoned (III.21-22; I.20-21). The act of violating this principle is, in less serious cases, a violation of civil law (*legius populorum*) and common law (*iure gentium*) by destroying communal solidarity, and in more serious cases, a violation of the divine and human law that nature has endowed (*lex divina et humana*), or natural law (III.23). The second is the principle of non-domination which is based on mutual dependence. This principle reflects the duty of the citizen to promote the public good through taking care of one another especially in their needs to work together (I.22; III.25). Viewed in this principle, a person who does not protect the victim of a devastate situation, or is uninterested in putting an end to such a devastation, is an immoral person, just like the people who have abandoned their parents, friends and their fatherlands (I.23). Here it is justified to violate the principle of non-interference for the sake of the public interest (III.30), the tyrant is despised because from the start it is an arbitrary rule of a person who has no mutual dependence with the members of the community, and the act of killing the tyrant is approved as a heroic civic action (III.29 & 32). The third is the principle of civic trust that dictates in any situation that a promised work must be done. Based on this principle, the preservation of the state does not justify all actions. The act of breaking an alliance for a unilateral interest cannot be justified (III.49). The aforementioned two principles must be applied not only to fellow citizens but also to foreigners (III.28). Even if there is a war on which the community’s survival depends, cruelty and barbarism cannot be allowed. Brutality and injustice committed against foreigners, and the act of breaking the trust among states, will corrupt citizen spirit and ultimately cause the republican state to fall into disorder (I.35). To Cicero, these three principles constitute the road to harmonize nature, individual desire, natural law and patriotism. Thus, even if virtuous citizens do not have the pride or decorum and philosophical nobleness, it is a principle of action that must be kept and that discreet good people (*boni viri*) should convince others to follow.

Recently, liberty as non-domination has been offered a political principle through which all countries are located as bearers of equal voice in the international political community.

For example, there are expectations that liberty as non-domination create the positive conditions that sustain the ongoing negotiation of conflicts sufficient to defend human rights against domination across borders. There are also instances where by proposing global governance in a form similar to federalism, it presents liberty as non-domination as a political principle that is capable of reciprocal cooperation and can prevent the reproduction of the pre-existing unequal relationship in the international community by consenting on the least general procedures. In all these instances, civic responsibility at the international level that Cicero's decorum encompasses is expected, on the one hand, to secure civic solidarity and on the other hand, to play the role of reducing the exclusivity of patriotism. When decorum formulated through reciprocal non-domination is internalized by every individual, and when each person tries to maintain decorum, decorum as a civic responsibility can contribute to harmonizing the love of fatherland and the love of humanity.

IV. Conclusion

Hitherto, by exploring the dominant understandings of citizenship and juxtaposing their defects with the contents of citizenship in classical republicanism, I have developed the conception of reciprocal non-domination which provides the normative basis for fostering global citizenship without undermining civic responsibility. Through this process, the following two arguments are laid out. First, the conception of citizenship in neo-Roman republicanism is insufficient to hold the classical meaning of citizenship which is adequate to the era of globalization. Traditional liberalism takes into consideration legal and institutional rights more than civic responsibility, while communitarianism has excessively emphasized the priority of the whole over the individual without suggesting a persuasive link between individual liberty and civic virtue. Contrastingly, starting from the individual rather than the whole in the context of liberty as non-domination, neo-Roman republicanism greatly contributes to establishing a basis to discuss civic responsibility together with individual autonomy. Nonetheless, neo-Roman republicanism, by excessively probing legal and institutional conditions, has the limitation that it failed to completely overcome the problems of traditional liberalism. Second, the notion of citizenship in classical republicanism betters civic responsibility by focusing self-love instead of selfishness and acknowledging the complexity of human sociability in a pendulum between nature and nurture. Specifically, the individual level of civic responsibility was specified via reciprocal non-domination based on Aristotle's 'serious' citizen discussion; the state-level civic responsibility was conceptualized through democratic contestability in Machiavelli's republicanism; the international level of civic responsibility was organized via Cicero's decorum that can be applied across boundaries. These three principles can provide the

normative warrant for global citizenship that is generally lacking in liberal as well as communitarian versions of citizenship.

When viewing from the context of classical republicanism, current discussions about global citizenship are problematic in the two aspects. First, nationality and citizenship are used interchangeably. The former takes no account of the appropriate form of political system, whereas the latter is different in accordance with the characteristics of political system. Also, the former requires dedication to the community through nationalism, but in the latter, devotion is cultivated through actual experiences in a society. Second, there is no serious discussion about a regulative principle that guides possible contestations about the contents of global citizenship. Interdependence and interaction in the era of globalization may contribute to the establishment of a transnational civil society in which an agreement through deliberation on global citizenship is easily achieved. However, the possibility of establishing such a transnational civil society requires a political principle with which what each respective political community conceives as an imperative content of global citizenship. In this vein, I believe that the conception of citizenship in classical republicanism can complement our shortcomings. Citizenship in classical republicanism will help us set up a reasonable ground for reciprocal non-domination that can develop into a new form of civic solidarity across cultures. If this kind of citizenship is absent, reciprocal non-domination will be the condition for our deliberation to make a desirable political system, and if a political system where reciprocal non-domination can be formed is completed, then the core of our deliberation will be extended to global citizenship.

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